Table of Contents

Contents

A- Note on Method and Interest
B- Introductory Comments

1- Synthesis in Kant’s Aesthetical Idea (1988)

2- Making and Comparison- The Arena of Judgment in the Third Critique (1996)

3- Negative Dialectics- Composition on the Threshold of Tragic Sympathy (1990)

4- Scenes From the Theater of a Moral Desire-Mission in the Critique of Practical Reason (1991)

5- Emmanuel Levinas and the ‘Love’ of Knowledge (1989)

6- Contest and Justification- Judgment Within and Beyond the Limits of Reason (1996)

7- Unity in the House of Reason (1997)

A- Note on Method and Interest

From the very beginning of my classes in the Philosophy department at SIU, strong emphasis was placed on the primacy of the text under consideration in any academic writing, so that was the origin of my method in any philosophy paper I wrote for class. This element was strong in the teaching of Professors John Howie, Garth Gillan, George Schedler, Robert Hahn, Mark Johnson, and Stephen Tyman. I read the book at least once through and then go to secondary books and then to philosophers index and find any articles I could that appeared to have connection to my topic. Then on the second and subsequent readings I would write 1) what I thought to be ‘key’ sections of the text, as notes on notecards, and 2) any thoughts that would pop into my head relating to that section of the text and the subject of the text. In this way I could be assured that what I wrote was based on the text, and was not any attempt to manufacture or connect meaning that was not text related. From these 2 sets of notes, I then attempted to find a coherent thread to compose my piece. In my mind and in my heart this then made my attempt an effort at what I considered to be ‘authentic Philosophy’- either academic or however slightly original the writing might be- at least it was my authentic best effort at writing authentic scholarship and philosophy.

So this was the method I diligently executed in writing all the essays in the Kant Variations. This then explains the condensed nature of the writing. I made no attempt to write in any particular tradition, but just wrote what I found in the text, on the topics in the text that seemed important to the meaning of the book. In the end, especially for me, understanding the text is primary, and the work comes from there, and then the kind of philosopher you naturally are is revealed after the fact.

Now, From a review of my comments throughout the essays, it is clear that what I focused on in the texts of Kant, Adorno, Levinas, Derrida, Gadamer, and others, were sections of the text that describes and relates to some sort of direct experience, that explains complex phenomenon of thought, and/or human experience, and/or evidence of god in experience, in the overall understanding of the book, and in the overall contribution to understanding how the text contributes to the wisdom of life. This then, as a Philosopher, first and foremost makes me a Pragmatist, even though the subjects focused on were from the tradition of Kant, Adorno, and Levinas. In retrospect, I believe that it was the Pragmatic aspects and religious orientation of Ricouer’s writing and descriptions that drew me along through his work

So what I’ve written then is a Pragmatist philosophical/theological reading/meditation of sections of the Critique of Judgment, the Critique of Practical Reason, the Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Mein Kampf, Negative Dialectics, and Totality and Infinity. This puts me squarely in the midst of the Pragmatist, Kant, and recent continental traditions.

This is quite funny to me- because even though I have read Dewey’s ‘Nature and Experience’, and some book of William James. I have no extensive training or experience with Pierce, or Dewey, or Rorty or any of the other Pragmatists. And apparently I need to read Victor Anderson (Vanderbilt) ‘Pragmatic Theology (1992), as well as his dissertation which covers another subject of pragmatic theology. Here I spend all this time on Kant, and I am a pragmatist. But I guess that’s how it goes if you are to honestly discover the type of thinker you are, that your method of Philosophy doesn’t exactly match that of tradition of your subject.

Sincerely,

Rick Luczak

B- Introductory Comments

The following essays comprise a series of Critical ‘Songs’ on texts of Immanuel Kant and others where the writing intersects with Kant’s. They are critical in the traditional sense of beginning from scholarly investigation. They are also songs in the sense that they vary from the traditional form of expository essay and venture into modes of poetic description, exhortation, and imperative.

I hope that they add both to the Critical understanding of the Kantian tradition of scholarship, as well as to an appreciation of the majesty and mystery of existence that coarse through his writing.

The ‘song’ mode will undoubtedly be confounding for many- skipping in the midst of a section to other areas where the strain of thinking follows. There are passages where the author- in attempting to make clear an area of text- will cause the reader to think that what is before them further obscures the issue by taking the issue farther out on the edge of clarity, and varying from Kant. But if the reader returns to the original text and then back to mine again, he/she will find that what Kant writes becomes more clear after reading this book. Kant might probably have called this book a ‘mere Rhapsody’.1 This is not a book for the Kant beginner, nor for the casual student.

Much has been written, of course, since the time of his death, beautiful- intricate- illuminating original philosophy and also secondary scholarship. I do not pretend to eclipse any of what these authors have written, but wish to join them- both in argument and in the tradition of writing- in order to contribute on page to the understanding of this life we share.

Richard J. Luczak II
Chicago, 1997

Chapter 1- Synthesis in Kant's Aesthetical Idea

The purpose of this paper is to highlight an aspect of Immanuel Kant's aesthetic theory treated in the Critique of Judgment, and to present this aspect in such a way that will lead towards work that shows an anticipation of later currents in western philosophy. The aspect I wish to highlight is depicted within the tension of his discussion between the requirement of the judgment of the beautiful to possess a subjective universality, and the requirement that the product of Genius, beautiful art, be exemplary. This aspect of his theory will first be shown within the frameworks of personal and cultural development, and then will be brought into much sharper focus within the technicalities of discussion in Kant's notion of an aesthetical idea. The significance of this notion will then be sketched to illuminate its importance in current work on language and meaning, and a unity with that work and Hegel's presentation of spirit.

For Kant, the judgment of something as beautiful comes about through a passive reflection on the object which is submitted to the cognitive faculties for mere estimation. Without determination by any concept, but in mere play, the cognitive faculties estimate the form of the object, and then come into an accord that produces the pleasure known as beauty. The object is therefore termed 'beautiful". This reflection is subjective for Kant because a concept does not determine the course of reflection; the object is presented for a passive estimation and not a conceptual determination. the reflection can be universal for Kant because we seem to be able to communicate this act of reflection, its feeling, and conceptual determination as well. Because we do communicate, Kant infers that there must exist a common ground of this ability.

"But if cognition’s are to admit of communicability, so must also the state of mind, i.e. the accordance of the cognitive powers with a cognition generally and that proportion of them which is suitable for a presentation (by which an object is given to us) in order that a cognition may be made out of it admit of universal communicability 1."

Because we all possess this 'common sense', the judgment of an object as beautiful can be demanded of everyone. For Kant as well, the beautiful object is exemplary; it is that towards which we strive as a culture. Genius, as the productive faculty of the beautiful, communicates this feeling for Kant in the following manner.

The ideas of the artist excite like ideas in his pupils if nature has endowed them with a like proportion of mental powers. 2

Something must be communicated here, some intellectual transformation must be undergone by the receiver of the beautiful. And while Genius is bestowed upon the artist as a gift of nature, attaining this exemplary level of production does not seem to occur by accident, as Kant shows.

"That for beautiful art in its entire completeness much science is requisite, e.g. a knowledge of ancient languages, a learned familiarity with classical authors, history, a knowledge of antiquities, etc. And hence these historical sciences, because they form the necessary preparation and basis for beautiful art". 3

What the text implies here is that there must be some commonality between learning advanced by conceptual means and the experience of the beautiful. Otherwise, the historical sciences Kant mentions would not be the 'necessary preparation and basis' for beautiful art. This implication carries with it that the experience of the beautiful produces a development along the lines of a learning, or of at least a pre-learning. Kant further enforces this view that genius is not a mere stumbling upon, but an effort; a labor, and at the same time, a transformative ordering, a development.

"Taste, like the judgment in general, is the discipline (or training) of Genius; it clips its wings, it makes it cultured and polished; but at the same time, universally assented to, and capable of being followed by others, an of an ever progressive culture". 4

Genius for Kant is a production through freedom, but the freedom unleashed does have a direction. The problem I find is this. How can the exemplary, that towards which we strive as a culture to attain, be universally communicable, and demanded of as being so. The terms exemplary and universal seem to exclude each other by their very meaning.

The exemplary work of art, the exceeding activity needed to attain the level of beautiful production, seems to exclude an appreciation for those not developed or attuned to a like degree of the artist. For an uneducated, untrained person to grasp the beauty in the incredible complexity of a work of a Mozart or a Van Gogh, seems highly unlikely. Although the language of particular parts of the text demands universal assent and an opposing exemplariness, other language in the text shows a more appropriate, although not staticly determinate conception of the situation.

To say that there is a possibility, of universal communicability rather a necessity of it, would not exclude the judgment of an object as beautiful from being extended to the average or underdeveloped mind. I would suggest that Kant's criterion for universality in the agreement of the judgment of the beautiful is not to be taken as an aesthetical ubiquity to be immediately demanded of, but that the purposive ordering experienced when contemplating the object occurs for different people according to their particular level of development. This development may eventually reach a culturally accepted level of exemplariness at a later date.

It seems then, if we accept this interpretation, that the opposition created in the text by the nature of the Kantian terminology and method, creates a dynamic, ascending scale of ability in the grasping powers of appreciation of the object of beauty. In this way any individual can feel purposiveness requisite with his or her point of development of mental disposition, and then the exemplary in culture need not be fettered. It can be viewed as more of a case of exemplary for.

I think that Kant would disagree with this interpretation of his theory of productive genius. A strict, more narrow reading demands a level of exemplariness incompatible with the grasping powers of the ordinary individual. And although the ordinary man may produce an object through toil which presents a new ordering for those near his level of development, it still may be far from exemplary for the standards of the best in a culture. It is the emphasis on the apprehending in the ordering quality of the exemplary and not the effort aspect of the art, in the Kantian treatment of the beautiful; that in the end renders Kant's theory antagonistic towards, and hence irreconcilable with, a universal aesthetic immediacy. This ordering activity that we have examined in the cultural arena comes into much sharper focus upon examination of the powers of apprehending and producing found in Kant's elaboration of the "aesthetical idea".

Genius, for Kant, is a gift of nature. It is an innate mental disposition of the subject which schematizes in freedom, and can then be followed thereafter as a rule of action for production of beautiful art. It is a willful occurrence that is not confined in its outburst, but is channeled into a direction and quality of production. The outflow is not an explosion, not a mere force that does not discriminate for appropriateness, but is a kind of taking-in that is simultaneously a giving-out, a kind of feeling-force. The gathering process, the occurrence of ordering, is on the point of an activity that exists, for Kant; for a feeling indicative of a commonality and also an individuality.

Kant focuses this roundabout view of being by juxtaposing different general statements about beauty and productive Genius, and then closes in this view by illuminating its conceptual structure, then further by illuminating its sub-conceptual structure. One juxtaposition is found in the structure of meaning in the statement of beauty as production through freedom. Freedom carries with it an implication of not being constrained, a type of non-confinement. However, willful production is only recognizable according to a direction that shows a traceable pattern, a delineation of sorts, and thus a restraint. The tension between will and freedom is illustrated by Kant in the following statements.

"By right we ought only to describe as art, production through freedom, i.e. through a will that places reason as the basis of its actions". 5,

and

"in a product of beautiful art, we must become conscious that is art and not nature; but yet the purposiveness in its form must seem to be as free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature". 6

thirdly,

"Nature is beautiful because it looks like art, and art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as art while yet it looks like nature". 7

What Kant is pointing to is that the will is not always knowable by conceptual means, but can be grasped in the sense that there is a grasping inherent in feeling, and vice versa. He thus shows that production also exceeds the boundaries of a conceptual format and must be dealt with as willing that can be grasped by other means, and that the production immanent in willing, must simultaneously be a grasping. that is how he focuses the discussion towards its apex in the working of the aesthetical idea.

Kant's elaboration of the aesthetical idea is one pole of a juxtaposition between animation and structure inherent in being as a knowing-feeling; in striving as a gathering. For Kant, Genius is the faculty for production of aesthetical ideas. This is accomplished via the spirit, which for Kant is the animating principle of the mind. By following the animating principle of the mind we are made aware of the power of the faculty of imagination. Through the imagination, we take the materials of experience and rework these orders, these structures, through freedom, into new orders which surpass the precious manners of recognition and production. The representations of the imagination that do this are called 'ideas'.

"Such representations of the imagination we may call ideas. Partly because they least strive after something which lies beyond the bounds of experience and so seek to approximate to a presentation of concepts of reason (intellectual ideas), thus giving to the latter the appearance of objective reality, but especially because no concept can be fully adequate to them as internal intuitions. The poet ventures to realize to sense..." 8

The dynamism immanent in Kant's depiction brings forth a reality, shows to the knower a reality not previously possible. It makes real, according to the rules of sense. It brings sense out of the noumena through productive activity the static markings of a concept, it opposes the static aspect of structure that helps make our world knowable. Through Kant's critical structure we begin to see the dynamic concept of flux as a knowing. Here we find similarities to Hegel's concept of spirit as it is presented in the workings of the negative in the chapter on perception in his Phenomenology of Spirit.

"Supersession exhibits its true twofold meaning which we have seen in the negative: it is once a negating and a preserving. Our nothing, as the nothing of the this, preserves its itself sensuous, but it is a universal immediacy. Being, however, is a universal in virtue of its having mediation or the negative within it; when it expresses this in its immediacy it is a differentiated, determinate property". 9

In the statement Nature is beautiful because it looks like art, and art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as art, while it looks like nature, we see art as a willing, an effort produced in freedom without conceptual determination. It shows purposiveness followed freely, and placed in contrast to the very same freedom in another moment that produces a work that looks like a will, an effort, is behind the production. The tension in this juxtaposition brings about the feeling of contact with the dialectical development of transcendental consciousness, in a recognition along the lines of a restriction, a limiting moment of will that allows a thing to emerge in meaning form the unordered flux, that must also afford a transcendence in order for art to be a new, or re-ordering. This effect, in combination with the striving/gathering power illuminated in the workings of the aesthetical idea at the point of this emergence(shown also in Hegel's quote above), and with the statement at pg. 163 about an ever progressive culture, all show the working of an idea very similar to Hegel's world spirit as he develops it in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

This dynamic characterization being depicted in Kant’s elaboration of the aesthetical idea thus makes it very difficult to see his theory of common sense along such plain lines as those found in a very strict reading of the text. I think that Hegel is depicting the same aspect of being, but from the generation of spirit described through a phenomenology. Kant depicts this similar view through the meaning created between the tension of this critical language, by what he would call an analogical method.

The presence of a type of development associated with the judgment of the beautiful indicated by the passages cited here, contradicts a traditional Kantian reading. The assertion in question is that nothing is learned by the judgment of the beautiful. Although development may not proceed conceptually through the experience of the beautiful, there must be some grasping factor in the gathering process that constitutes the estimation of the object. Without this apprehending and reordering there would only be a blank stare, the object as not-beautiful does not make sense. If this were the case, the entire process of an ever progressive culture referred to in the text would not be possible. This is the objection that Gadamer raises in what he calls the 'radical subjectivization of the aesthetic in his work Truth and Method.

"Is there to be no knowledge in art? Does not the experience of art contain a claim to truth which is certainly different from that of science, but equally certainly is not inferior to it? And is not the task of aesthetics precisely to provide a basis for the fact that artistic experience is a mode of knowledge of a unique kind, certainly different from all moral rational knowledge and indeed from all conceptual knowledge, but still knowledge, i.e. the transmission of truth"? 10

Although there is a contradiction in the text between a grasping cultivation inherent in the experience of beauty, and Kant's insistence that nothing is learned, I would suggest that the text tends to support a Hegelian view of spirit. Gadamer rightly turns to Hegel for this resolution.

"It is necessary to take the idea of experience more than Kant did, so that the experience of the work of art can be understood as experience. For this we can appeal to Hegel's fine lectures on aesthetics. Here the truth that lies in every artistic experience is recognized and at the same time mediated with historical consciousness . Hence aesthetics becomes a history of world views, i.e. a history of truth, as it is seen in the mirror of art. It is also a fundamental recognition of the task that I formulated of justifying the knowledge of truth in the experience of art itself" 11

I assert that one can find this type of historical consciousness, that of an ever progressive culture, in the meaning of Kant's text. We see that my interpretation of Kant, through the references to 'development' in the text, along with its focus on the apprehending and ordering qualities illuminated by the working of the aesthetical idea, answers Gadamer's objection along lines that he himself turns to rectify the 'radical subjectivization of the Aesthetic'. I also assert that Gadamer's turn to Hegel for this historical consciousness merely reinforces the appropriateness of Kant's not so apparent view. Kant presents an entire construction of a view by which something must be learned in the experience of beauty, and this does not preclude his demand that the experience of beauty be non-conceptual. We find with Johnson 12, that there must be some pre-conceptual experience that is communicable, grasping, and this is reinforced upon an examination of the intricacies of the ordering and grasping immanent in Kant's notion of the aesthetical idea. This meaning can be conveyed, as Kant shows, through the vehicle and process of symbolic presentation. The examination of symbolic presentation is needed to clarify Kant's notion of an aesthetical idea.

For Kant, analogy is the structure, the vehicle, by which the aesthetical idea is conveyed. The form of reflection normally associated with one work is applied to another term and the ordering that subsequently occurs produces a pleasure indicative of an accord in the purposiveness of the form with the cognitive faculties. This applies to Kant’s critical structure because the form of reflection solidified previously by a determinative statement, undergoes a modification by further statements about the subject. 'Genius is', in a previous section, is modified by a later 'Genius is', or 'Genius is not'. Either way, the original form of reflection on the term and its meaning is applied by the latter, and a construction of new meaning emerges. In this way, critical works undergo what Kant depicts in his treatment of analogy. The aesthetical idea is at the heart of where this appropriateness is communicated symbolically.

"All hypotyposis(presentation, subjectio sub aspectum), or sensible illustration, is twofold. is either schematical, when to a concept comprehended by the understanding the corresponding intuition is given, or it is symbolical. In the latter case, to a concept only thinkable by reason, to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is supplied which accords a procedure of the judgment analogous to what it observes in the schematism, i.e. merely analogous to the rule of this procedure, not to the intuition itself, consequently to the form of the reflection merely and not to its content". 13

There is an elaboration of being and meaning treated in the text that presents a meaning that anticipates later work on metaphor and the creation of meaning in language. Paul Ricoeur is one scholar noted for work in this field. Although not to be taken as exhaustive, a quote from his book The Rule of Metaphor, offers a glimpse at the seminal nature of Kant's work by showing strong similarities in a division of meaning by a language scholar, and one that can easily be found in Kant's elaboration of the aesthetical idea.

"So what Jean Ladriere has termed the power of signifying in order to stress its operative and dynamic character, is the intersection of two movements. One movement aims at determining more rigorously the conceptual traits of reality, while the other aims at making referents appear. This circularity between the abstractive phase and the concretizing phase makes this power of signifying an unending exercise, a 'continuing odyssey’". 14

Here there is a clear correlation between meaning and the gathering together of reality referred to previously in this paper. There is a division along the lines of gathering as determinative knowing that ideas strive to realize, and the production immanent in Kant's theory. There is a strong similarity to the negation and determinativeness indicated in Hegel earlier, and there is also its realization in language that Kant properly, but not exhaustively, indicates in the text by the reference to analogy.

In Kant's critical structure and language on the judgment of the beautiful and productive Genius, Kant creates a metaphor that first allows the reader to feel the tracing of this dynamic ordering as his own mind generates it, and thus conveys a much deeper, and intricate conception of meaning that a strict reading will allow.

The aesthetical idea stands at the very heart of Kant's conception of meaning as its unifying moment, as a touching of the supersensible that we can possess and share. It is a reaching, a striving, a gathering, and a feeling that reminds us of our freedom and its makeup. It is the indicator that spirit is present, and thus is the life of our thought.

"It can be only that in the subject which is nature and cannot be brought under rules of concepts, i.e. the supersensible substrate of all his faculties, and consequently that with respect to which it is the final purpose given by the intelligible of our nature to harmonize all our cognitive faculties. thus alone is it possible that there should be a-priori at the basis of this purposiveness, for which we can prescribe not an objective principle, a principle subjective and yet of universal validity". 15

The development of the text from discussion of more general forms of a progressive, cumulative consciousness, to its workings at the heart of a discussion of meaning in language, shows the aesthetical idea at the point of synthesis of these two separately treated subjects. It shows a way in which a phenomenology of consciousness needs not exclude an analysis of language of meaning. It shows how the latter provides a more intricate dynamism to the original depiction of the former. When reflecting about the subject matter and methods of Hegel's work and Ricoeur's later work on metaphor, it seems as it this work were intended as a more general attempt to show the point of unity of these two subjects. This then answers an unneeded objection by Gadamer, but agrees with sensitive insights he has that show a more appropriate significance of aesthetics, that a more traditional reading that Kant offers.

Kant wishes to show a division along the lines of a gathering animation that feels, a life giving principle to structure, that searches for a way to make real, to schematize that which cannot be sufficiently schematized. It is the not simple gathering at the edge of our abilities that lets us know that we are alive, creative creatures.

"In the most universal signification of the work, ideas are representation referred to an object, according to a certain principle, but so that they can never become a cognition of it. They are either referred to an intuition, according to a merely subjective principle of the mutual harmony of the cognitive powers, and they are called aesthetical; or they are referred to a concept according to an objective principle, although they can never furnish a cognition of the object, and are called rational ideas. In the latter case the concept is a transcendent one, which is different from a concept of the understanding, to which an adequately corresponding experience can always be supplied and which therefore is called immanent.
An aesthetical idea cannot become a cognition because it is an intuition(of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found. A rational idea can never become a cognition because it involves a concept(of the supersensible) corresponding to which an intuition can never be given". 16

The aesthetical idea is the feeling of this initial bringing forth of sense form out of the noumena. It is at the point of our development forced on by a willed apprehension. It shows us, and inclines us towards, a shared commonality. Kant wishes to show the tracings, the real indications, of being by tracing it to the point where we begin to bring sense out of the noumena. At this point Kant thinks we cannot go further. Beyond this point by which we think and can speak about being and how this emerges in meaning, Kant thinks there is only speculation.


Notes
1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, (New York: Hafner, 1972), pg. 75.
2. Kant, pg. 152.
3. Kant, pg. 114.
4. Kant, pg. 163.
5. Kant, pg. 145.
6. Kant, pg. 149.
7. Kant, pg. 149.
8. Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroads, 1975), pg. 87.
9. Gadamer, pg. 87.
10. Kant, pg. 157.
11. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pg. 68.
12. Mark Johnson, The Body In the Mind, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pg. 161.
13. Kant, pg. 197.
14. Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pg. 298.
15. Kant, pg. 189.
16. Kant, pg. 187.

Chapter 2- Making and Comparison, The Arena of Judgment in the 3rd Critique

"In order to distinguish whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer the representation, not by the understanding to the object for cognition, but by the imagination (perhaps in conjunction with the understanding) to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or pain." 1

Kant thus begins the great third critique. In order to distinguish whether a thing is beautiful or not. In order to distinguish whether anything, anything at all, is beautiful or not. And thus begins the odyssey to describe what it means to say that some thing is beautiful and to describe the arena of judgment.
To distinguish. To perceive as being separate or different. To set above or apart from others. In the case of the beautiful to definitely set above. To exalt a thing, as beautiful. To exalt a thing. But what type of judgment is this judgment of taste, this setting apart, this exaltation- in saying that something is beautiful?
The purpose of this essay is to highlight two principal themes in the Critique of Judgment2 that are at the root of this book. These themes are Comparison and Power which taken together in process are the principal components of Kant’s use of the notion of ‘Purpose’ and ‘Purposiveness’ so fundamental to the 3rd Critique. My thesis here is that ‘Purpose’ is treated by Kant as Making in the 3rd Critique, and that the process of Making is best elucidated as the dialectic between Comparison in the work of reflection, and Power. In this work I hope to color, a bit, the framework of the concept of ‘purpose’ presented in the text of the Critique of Judgment, and by this add to the body of scholarship that has helped us to understand and appreciate what we can of this philosophical masterpiece.
Comparison is approached first in the process of distinguishing whether anything is beautiful or not, in the comparison of the object to the order of experience. Secondly, comparison is at the heart of the feeling of the sublime considered mathematically and considered dynamically, and through this feeling we learn much about the dynamics of the power to-make as a consequence of comparison. This sense of power to-make we find constitutive of judgment itself. The power of judgment to make sense, of the inner sense received by the sensory apparatus and capabilities of man. This power of making sense is twofold in reflection. It is first the power to show in the presenting of the phantasm as phenomenon, and secondly it is the power to connect this intelligible barrage into an object, into a thing of reflection. Power is then also approached as the external power to-make treated in the Kant’s elucidation of productive Genius.
Collisions occur at the limits of the judging consciousness in the dialectic of reflection and making, in the dialectic of making and touch, in the perception and active participation in the phenomena of extension, and in the perception and making sense of dynamic interplay of flux. There is the collision in the design of competitive interdependence in the social dialectic and finally there is a collision of judgment with its own limits in the design and social value of the arc of the time of life. These scenes comprise both outer and inner boundaries for the arena of judgment. The attempt of this work is to briefly outline these boundaries.
First I will write on the structure of making in the judgment of taste. Next I will write on the connection between reflection and feeling that forms the basis of judgment for Kant, in the form of making sense. From here I proceed to elucidate the workings of power involved in the judgment of the sublime- first considered mathematically and then considered dynamically. Finally I will write on the anthropological parameters that bind the theme of making in the third critique together, and give this grand project of making its’ teleology a certain vector- its’ eschatology.

1)-Reflection and Making
Kant introduces purpose in the Third Critique, according to it's transcendental determinations with regards to, and special emphasis on, causality. The definition of purpose strikes a delicate balance between the reflective aspects of cause with reference to the object as effect, and the aspect of cause as agency. The emphasis here though is not the full spectrum of agency, but of agency as making. Certainly other aspects of agency, mainly the aspect of 'doing' enter into the equation of Kant's notion of purpose, but the emphasis in the definition, and the import for the entire book, is on the notion of the power of making. Through effort and results, the object as effect, and the effect then as intelligible observation.

"If we wish to explain what a purpose is according to its transcendental determinations (w/out presupposing anything empirical like the feeling of pleasure) we say that the purpose is the object of a concept, in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the existence of object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept in respect of its object is its purposiveness. Where then not merely the cognition of an object but the object itself is thought of as an effect only possible by means of the concept of this latter, there we think a purpose. 3

So even though the approach of the text is a critique of the Reflective Judgment, the notion of purpose conveyed is that of what sits in the center of the dialectic of reflection and making. In the section the Analytic of the Beautiful the perspective is from reflection and the reflective judgment.
The judgment of taste deals with the effect of form on feeling. For Kant the imagination and the understanding come into accord in the passive reflection upon the form of the object. In the object known as beautiful the symbolic element comes into play. The aesthetic idea is an idea that produces thought without having a definite concept for it. So that the feeling of the beautiful refers to the mind’s dynamic tracing of the form- the flight of thought. The mark of form that carries the weight of the aesthetical idea is named by Kant the aesthetic attribute. This is a definite form that carries with it no definite idea, but works as a symbol, an indefinite idea that causes more thought, or an excess of thought. The aesthetical attribute is a type of form without concept, a mark that bears no definite concept but produces a symbol. This passive estimation brings us into contact with productive Genius, and in the act of productive Genius Kant deals with producing, form-ing, with making form. In form-ing we cause the existence of the object, the never-before object. Genius produces the object, the reflective judgment of taste produces this feeling.
Desire is thus manifested in the notion of purpose as making, in Nietzschean terms as will-to-power as making. In the universal voice what is communicated is the international supra-linguistic language of making, and the assertion that this power can be communicated through reflection. In making we all 'speak the same language'. The strange and cryptic Idea of 'purposiveness without purpose' in Kant is thus not strange at all, in fact very common to judgment. In general all it means is that we cannot view an object without thinking of it as having been 'made' somehow. In science we view an objects properties by observation, but also by taking the object apart to 'see how they are made'. So that reflection upon an object, even without interest in the existence of that object, will render a common, universal voice from the very nature that it is a made object, and the object itself, through passive reflection on its form, will 'say' something that is the same to all of us, because to-make is common to all of us.
So even though we possess no interest at all in the existence of the object, by passive contemplation the structure, the play of the mind in apprehending the delineation, excites the cognitive powers by the power of making. It is this power which 'speaks' in the work of art. The form Kant uses to describe the reflective act of taste is agreement, the harmony of assent between at least two. It is this power of agreement which says something through mere reflection upon the object. It is the power of agreement which we exalt.

A representation which, as individual and apart from comparison with others, yet has an agreement with the conditions of universality which it is the business of the understanding to supply, brings the cognitive faculties into that proportionate accord which we require for all cognition, and so regard as holding for everyone who is determined to judge by means of understanding and sense in combination (i.e. for every man). 4

The Agreement of the faculties with form is a contract with the world. This Agreement about the world, an agreement with the form of things. In the first sense, present in the agreement of the faculties is a promise to act, in the second sense of agreement is the contract we have with things, a corporeal recognition of that which we have in common with things. Within and beyond the structure of the self- in a common sense, to-gether.
Because of our own will and our own process of making the lines of order we see in an object, in a group of objects, and in a process are seen precisely as the markings of purpose. Because to be free means to act, through self-legislation, and the anthropological root, the history of such action is work. Action-doing with a purpose- to work, making a chair, making clean, making safe, making a more pleasant environment.

But now why is it that teleology usually forms no proper part of theoretical natural science, but is regarded as a propaedeutic or transition to theology? This is done to restrict the study of nature mechanically considered to that which we can so subject to observation or experiment that we are able to produce it ourselves as nature does, or at least by similar laws. For we see into a thing completely only so far as we can make it in accordance with our concepts and bring it to completion. But organization, as an inner purpose of nature, infinitely surpasses all our faculty of presenting the like by means of art. And as concerns the external contrivances of nature regarded as purposive (wind, rain, etc.), physics, indeed, considers their mechanism, but it cannot at all present their reference to purposes, so far as this is a condition necessarily belonging to cause, for this necessity of connection has to do altogether with the combination of our concepts and not with the constitution of things. 5

In the function and act of domiciliation, judgment compares the new object or experience to the order of experience, and that order of experience is precisely a place or category where the current object or experience ‘belongs’. Although the eidetic markings, the pure, flat empirical markings of the phenomenon are not within the control of the judging subject, -- so much so that it seems that within the order of comparison the phenomenon under observation orders itself- the ‘Belonging-to’ involved is formulated in the very act of observation and driven by the sense that it- the identity- is ‘mine’. The gravity, then, of pure intellectual categorization, this sense of order, is precisely bound by my own sense of identification as having, as possession. What presents this order of experience to my judgment is a unity which in each and every case is ‘mine’. This sense of order is precisely a belonging-to, and this sense drives the process of unifying experience, in the making sense of things.
Therefore the ‘necessity of connection’ mentioned above is due not to the constitution of things but by the character of the understanding through the use of judgment and the use of things. Once again we find that Not only our conception of the world is ‘bound’, no- our entire structural framework of understanding, is bound and conditioned by the practical application of the concept. Reflection brought to concept in this sense facilitates reason’s place in the world, facilitates both the transposition of sense to meaning, and also facilitates the launching of the attempt to try, a type of fixing of coordinates in the approach of understanding towards reason. The concept has use only so far as it enables us to produce a thing, its very orientation arises out this concern for practical application, out of reason’s demand for totality. It can be said that the very nature of understanding, through judgment, in and of itself demands connection- demands making sense- regardless of the constitution of things. So far as we ‘see into things’, this is the character of that ‘seeing’.

Reflection and Touch

For Kant to subsume a particular under a universal is a determinant judgment, to find a universal for a particular, is a reflective judgment. The case of the beautiful though is enigmatic in regard to this categorical separation. For in Kant "In order to distinguish whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer the representation,...to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or pain." If the form of the object causes the imagination and understanding to come into accord we feel the pleasure known as the beautiful. Although we do have a universal- the 'beautiful' to begin with, it is not a determinant judgment, in Kant's terminology to call something beautiful. But by his own definition, is it a reflective judgment? In the act of taste, do we find the universal (beautiful) for the particular(object)? If we have found this universal, what is the character of the universal that we have found?
In order to distinguish, we reflect. In the process of ordering experience, we submit the representation of the object to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or pain. To reflect upon an object in order to distinguish whether an object is beautiful or not, we refer the representation to the subject for reflection. We submit the representation of the object to reflection- we re-collect experience and submit the object’s representation to the subject and feeling, and in doing so we submit this feeling to the order of experience.
In the judgment of the beautiful the imagination is employed in reflection precisely to find, if it can, a new universal, a standard of sense, by which to compare others. The part of imagination employed in the judgment of taste is that of finding, of looking for something, of discovery. We could say that the term beautiful is the ‘new’ universal for the faculty of discovery, of imagination as discovery. The imagination in the reflective act of taste is some type of tool in the faculty of discovery, but it is a 'new universal' each and every time, a new standard of sense. The beautiful here is always a discovery, we must always find it.
Following Lyotard6, reflection Domiciles through the tautegorical character of feeling ( as both message and content) and in the process of this attempted domiciling, the feelings of both the beautiful and the sublime arise as the imagination attempts to structure - with understanding or reason, the affectation- the feeling of pleasure or pain produced by the reflection in this act.
Feeling, touch, then is the center between the faculty of the natural concepts and the concept of freedom transposed into the will. If all impact of a generating will on the world is received as purposive, as if it were generated by an understanding, conversely all reception of sense data is touch and is also seen as purposive, but in a different way. Not only is the reception of this data seen as arising from an understanding, but also from a reflective judgment, driven not only by concept and logic, but by reflective feeling- a certain sense of rightness that indeed is housed- domiciled, determined or in discovery- determining. Touch points the way so to speak, brings us to find, shows forth, in that the contact made directs with a yes or no the continued course of the contact or its cessation. Nevertheless the sense of touch, bears its marks as affective and brings these marks to meaning in judgment, either determinately or reflectively. This is the import of feeling, a knowing through touch, being affected and impacted, and also directed. It is to this sense and its application in the world of nature that the notion of purpose is bound, and therefore the judgments of beauty and the sublime are bound. It is from this feeling that purpose arises, and from this feeling that sense, for Kant, can be called common.
Within and beyond the flight of thought, within and beyond the realm of the adorned, surpassing effort beyond effort, surpassing surpassing, extant. Within the very reason of acute, convulsive pain, carrying and dissolving within itself the fragile rationalization of election. Touch is a negative surpassing, a warmth and strength, where everything reaches in and enlarges, where everything else fades and goes away. Bound Celestially, gravely suspended, there is only you, and I.
Materials and riches arise and appear, and the physical structure of the world becomes visible, and I am laid bare. And all that I can give seems so small compared with that what I wish to give. To share. At all. What possible measure, what measure. All languages become one, and all sense becomes the same, and I see you in the mirror of this touch. And the depth of touch comes over me, moving through my wrapped skin and boiling flesh like a wave through water and settles with warmth or cool, scintillates, and appearance transforms itself. And I am transformed. In a perfect moment of clarity, to-gether, through the visceral and gnawing tactile edge of will coming to try. In any moment, the letting be, the allowing to be, in a lightning crystallization, where time is now fleeting, and now eternal, where every thing is one. To-gether. In a common sense. We.
Without this touch I am always falling apart, and it is this touch that makes me part of something greater, the only thing in this world that holds me together at all. Parts, separate, distended. Within all this a calm, a cool soothing, a floating silence, suspended. A sense of being held together, held. Calm your soul. The lifetime of chance, the opportunity of life In touch. Each other.
In fact it is the weight of the will, or as I will say- the sensible import of the act- that carries in itself the power to span the leap between the concept of freedom into the world of sense. This is the kernel present in the aesthetic attribute. Kant will say later in the teleological judgment in the section on final purposes that in the end the value of life is ‘nothing but the value we give to life’ - the value we give it. So that the degree to which we are able to span the gulf between freedom and the world of sense is in no way predictable, but may be observed only after we have acted. It is not here raised to the level of principle- but this differentiation must be acted out, and then observed. This differentiation must first be given.
Freedom means to act of our own- means to actualize in the world of sense. Order is not a theoretical imposition but is constantly being acted out, brought to order like the first drawing of the first map of the world. The exemplary as never-before so well suited, the never-before so adorned. The teleological principle is then the baggage carried by a will in the act of observation, but is also the uncanny chance of so much agreement with the principle of order as it is observed, of agreement with things. We carry purpose as if we are the bearer of a flag into uncharted territory, as if we indeed make the map of purpose ourselves. Each experience of the beautiful is compared with what we know, reorders experience -and makes of the world each time a new world.

“The concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the world of sense the purpose proposed by its laws, and consequently nature must be so thought that the conformity to law of its form at least harmonizes with the possibility of the purposes to be effected in it according to laws of freedom. There must be therefore, a ground of the unity of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains; and the concept of this ground, although it does not attain either theoretically or practically to a knowledge of the same, and hence has no peculiar realm, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other.” 7

Extension and Dominion –the Comparison of Power

The feeling of the sublime considered mathematically, and the sublime judged dynamically have to do with the feeling aroused by the comparison that occurs as a consequence of the imagination’s struggle and failure in the attempt to render to form, the comparison of power. In the Judgment of the Sublime, the imagination submits the representation to reflection and in the attempt to render the representation to form, the imagination fails. The representation is formless, boundless. So why would there be aesthetic feeling at all in the passive consideration of this boundlessness, because the lack of boundary brings the course of reflection upon what remains, and what remains is the estimation of the power in the formlessness, in the struggle to bring to form.
In passive contemplation the very nature, the strength of the boundless movement apprehended, and the overwhelming magnitude of the comparison brings forth a communication of the power of making. It is as if that power were a will at work. So through the notions of magnitude, and might, what is being communicated is the strength of the will, because making, because willing, is common to all of us.

'The faculty of desire, so far as it is determinable to act only through concepts, i.e. in conformity with the representation of a purpose, would be the will. But an object, or a state of mind, or even an action is called purposive, although its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of a purpose, merely because its possibility can be explained and conceived by us only so far as we assume for its ground a causality according to purposes, i.e. in accordance with a will which has regulated it according to the representation of a certain rule. There can be then, purposiveness without purpose, so far as we do not place the causes of this form in a will, but yet can only make the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves by deriving it from a will. 8

The Sublime Judged Mathematically-the Power of Extension and Fantastic Desires

For Kant, the root of the feeling of the sublime judged mathematically is the estimation of magnitude converted and reduced to the power of extension. Theoretically we can extend numbers, and therefore size, however in any sense of practice if we wish to physically extend, or physically extend anything within our own practical means, and within others practical means, then the notion of infinity disappears before our eyes. Sequences we extend do not go on infinitely, do not go on forever. Sequences we extend go on indefinitely, beyond definite, but not forever. Extension occurs, or can occur, or can- the possibility occurs not because of infinity, but because the finite that we know is not completely defined- it is indefinite. Here I differ with Kant.
Can we make a parallel between extension mathematically and the effort of the will. Mathematically can we say that extension stops with effort, if nothing else than the exertion it takes to continue that theoretical extension. So that the infinite, and the indefinite are practically the same at the point where apprehension fades and fails and the mind that thinks of infinity accepts the extension’s relation to reality not only as absurd, but as gibberish, as unrecognizable. The mathematically sublime does violence to the purpose of the concept, to the purpose of any concept, to the point where the concept meets the indefinite.
Now Kant will accept this definition of human extension only partially, he approaches the principle of extension as apprehension and accepts the principle to extend- and allows this principle to infinity. This process of having infinity in ourselves for Kant is the supersensible because the extension he speaks of is not a product of effort, but a product of the scenario of flux and the dynamic separation of things. This sense of extension we share with things more than with our sense, for we know that things and motion go on and extend beyond our sense. This structure is given, prior to experience. So this principle of extension is accepted by Kant as a principle of phenomena, but also a principle of noumena as well. I will say here that Hegel traces in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in the chapter Perception, the dynamic workings of the Negative in the production of separation and flux9. The negative creates flux, motion creates extension and the suspension /separation of objects. The given thus is prior to experience, but it is also a product of generation.
Furthermore, the extension- of this generation and of this apprehension- is not limited to the vector concentrations of the will, it sprays out upon the initiative of the will, and its initial verberations of the negative. The will explodes upon movement, creating in wonder and in mystery upon the fragment of apprehended support. Experience seems magnified, larger as we look, more important as we act, tragic as we suffer, haunted as we fear, brilliant as we see, and exalted as we rejoice. Behold!! The arena of apprehension is exaggerated as it forms. Happiness becomes everlasting joy, sadness becomes unending despair. The force of experience carries this always, this explosion which swallows all awareness of temporality. This explosion completely dominates the now, this force of import in the explosion of experience, and all seems ever so real.
Here though I will bind this principle of extension to generation in the anthropological realm of knowledge, for as our life is human life, we participate in this flux, in the supersensible, as humans. We only participate so long as we act, so long as we move, so long as there is effort, so long as we live. The suspended flux of separation and of things and the infinity of extension can be bound to motion anthropologically this way: distance as extension is that which is traveled, either physically or in the act of observation, so without this travel there may be an accepted principle of infinity- but this principle in itself makes no sense, because this principle’s structure is that of the possibility of every thing and every space being present to sense.
The principle of ‘jumping’ to accept the principle of extension, the absolutely large as a unit in progress thus means nothing, is absurd, but also means everything. It means nothing in the sense of practice of extension, in making the quantity in unit real in magnitude. Infinity in this second sense means everything in the project of existence generally. Infinity in the second sense means really to never stop extending, to extend eternally. Infinity therefore accepted in the generated, structured power of apprehension is the wish, and the tautegorical character of this wish is to not die, to always be.
Infinity is the feeling of the power to not-die, to always be. This is the universal voice expressed in the wish of the infinite will, and expressed in the acceptance of the formula for mathematical extension, in the unit, as apprehending the infinite. This is the incredible role and power of the wish- given power to accomplish in thought, and in the phantasm, what cannot be accomplished in any real conception. We believe we see it, the infinite, especially in a will, the infinite in the phantasm, the noumena. Absolutely strong, absolutely large, absolute power, absolute will. If ever....for-ever. The wish- a kind of eschatological extension and coloring to the ought projected in the common sense. Adorno writes- ‘The physical moment says that suffering ought not to be’10. I will now say that in this negative expression of the derivation of the ‘ought’ from the ‘is’, that there is underlying this another principle, both negative and positive. The physical moment of suffering here also says that it ought not to die, that ‘it- the physical moment itself- ought to go on forever’.
Time as extension collides with the feeling of the sublime judged mathematically as infinity extended numerically, and thus infinitely extended space. Infinity means really however to never stop extending, to extend eternally. Therefore infinity does not take mathematical extension as its proper model, but succession. Augustine’s framework of threefold present time. Time of the past present, time of the present present, and time of the future present.
What we can wish is infinite, in extension and in might, what we desire is infinite in extension and in might. But this wish collides with what we see and what we know.

Objection has been brought against a similar procedure of mine, and my definition of the faculty of desire has been found fault with, viz., that it is (the being’s) faculty of becoming, by means of its representations, the cause of the actuality of the objects of these representations; for the desires might be mere cravings, and by means of these alone everyone is convinced the object cannot be produced. But this proves nothing more than that there are desires in man, by which he is in contradiction with himself. For here he strives for the production of the object by means of the representation alone, from which he can expect no result, because he is conscious that his mechanical powers, which must be determined by that representation to bring about the object, are either not competent or even tend toward the impossible, e.g. to reverse the past or to annihilate in the impatience of expectation the interval before the wished for moment. Although in such fantastic desires we are conscious of the inadequacy of our representations for being causes of their objects, yet their reference as causes, and consequently the representation of their causality, is contained in every wish; and this is peculiarly evident if the wish is an affection or longing..... For we commonly learn to know our powers only by first making trial of them. 11

In this note Kant describes the structural limits of the wish and its notion of infinity. The wish here has a firmament of sorts in the notion of extension, a firmament that arches at the top and points beyond, but it also has an atmosphere of results and expectations that fall within the arc of this power. The measures, the traces, of this extension as human distance are motion and time, with time dependent on motion, as a road traveled. So long as we live, though, this principle of extension as succession, this thrownness of Dasein can be considered a principle of the structure of phenomena and noumena. But now this principle is bound to our participation in it, bound to how we know it, bound to apprehension as part of feeling- affectation. The base of infinity is thus eternity. To extend forever. Ubiquitous extension. This wish is the model for the infinite of Kant. Space extended at absolute speed and absolute measure, forever, pushing the arch forever upward. Infinity extended infinitely. Infinity, in human time, is thus the wish inherent in the very physical structure of feeling, the wish and the power to not-die, to always be.

The Dynamically Sublime- Power and Order

Might is that which is superior to great hindrances. It is called dominion if it is superior to the resistance of that which itself possesses might. Nature, considered in an aesthetical judgment as might that has no dominion over us, is dynamically sublime. 12

Now that which we are driven to resist is an evil and, if we do not find our faculties a match for it, is an object of fear. Hence nature can be regarded by the aesthetical judgment as might, and consequently as dynamically sublime, only so far as it is considered an object of fear. 13

The very definition, though, of the dynamically sublime brings us quickly to the root of physicality in the practical world. Might is defined in the first paragraph above by Kant as the ability to overcome great hindrances and the definition of the dynamically sublime is that which is absolutely great with regard to might. What is ‘hindered’ is a purpose though, either by some type of mechanical obstacle to the objective of this purpose, or more importantly by a conscious material resistance to that purpose, a will. This definition brings purpose into the arena of the contest. The ‘hindrance’ is a point at which purpose is contested, opposed, and the point at which this resistance is met is a point of overcoming. At this point the ability to overcome this hindrance is a facility, a power. The point of the ‘hindrance’ here is juncture where there is a comparison of powers, one contestant is superior, and the outcome has already been decided in that the point of the ‘hindrance’ is a contest won, and the opponent can be called a ‘hindrance’ rather than an opponent or conqueror. The definition of might here is therefore not so much that of force, but a definition and language of might from the position of the ‘victorious’.
Once again we are thrown into the very same analysis of the mathematically sublime grafted onto the physical world by what constitutes the ‘infinite’. Practically once again we run into the very same aporia as before as far as the perception of the infinite, however the effort of will implied redoubles not into my different form or argument, but it does seem so different. There is so much more allure to this idea of the absolutely great will, of a will absolutely large, absolutely extended- infinite- in all respects- even if it is beyond all our ability to conceive.
At the time of the sublime judgment it is the estimation of a power too-great, of a form yet-to-come, or a size beyond our power, an object yet-to-be that reflects a massive will. The turbulence of the sublime reflection for Kant, is then the reflection of the power of making, of the power of the will, in its formlessness, in its nature as possibility, coming to form as making.
The introduction of comparison of magnitude and the comparison of might, or as Kant calls it, the introduction of 'superiority', brings forward both a fundamental lack underlying the entire analysis of the analytic of the sublime, and also the fundamental strength. The fundamental lack we speak of here is tied into the spectrum of what it means to be great. The need for comparison, with regard to others, but more importantly to oneself is the issue. What does it mean to be great? Why is it a concern to be a better person than another? 'Greatness', to say that something is 'great' from mere passive contemplation, is a claim that carries a universal voice, recognizable by all as necessary. This point seems to locate the psychic lack, the flaw that corresponds with the physical moment of suffering, its physical equal. The point of the notion of greatness is also the point of defeat- the vanquishing of opponent, the diminishment of the good that stands alone, now brought into comparison.
Awe at the power of something we cannot make. Awe in the face of a power that just engulfs my power, your power, our collective power and all of humanity's power combined. Therefore the awe of a power of making so vast, so detailed, so destructive, so driven, so exquisite. Here we look at objects as being made somehow, here also we equate a power so overwhelming with our practical door to the world, our will; and think of a will so large, and purpose so much greater than ours, and a unity, a concept behind such a purpose. Such a power, such a will. The sweep of the power and its formlessness, and then the form that this power settles toward. In such a power a tremendous object is being made, and we know not what.
The preservation inherent in Hegelian supercession14 , that negates as well as preserves, while under threat. And- so- slowly- dies. And there is fire, blue and white, all around, a boiling heat. And there is a howling roar, in a tempest so strong that lightning lashes, blisters and scars the sky and a rumble thunder that shakes loose even the souls of the dead and makes them seem mortal once more. Torment upon torment, unending, this stench and hatred that can lie in me and looks at me. Destroyer. Life occurs within this pandemonium, but not all is despair- not beating back death.
Sinister and truthful is Kant who places the dynamics of comparison at the center of the analysis of the sublime- But roots its origins in the battle of the sensible standard- might. The battle involved in the feeling of the sublime is the battle of the imagination with reason, not with the understanding but with reason, with the principle of construction and the comparison of powers. Reflection upon a power of will so great as to cause the sublime feeling brings to mind greatness of purpose and greatness of will. In the attempt to bring to form, the formless nature of the apprehension shows forth a strength present in the formlessness which we cannot be adequate to.
Death from physical collision, from the storm, from the tornado. Destruction from the heat, from freezing, from the flood. Death from the lion attack, from the snake's bite. Having fear becomes the fear of destruction, it is the fear of death through force, the fear of suffering through pain. However Kant proceeds to show that direct fear cannot produce the movement of the mind called sublime. But so long as what is being considered is an object of fear, it is sublime. The movement of the sublime is then produced in the shadow of fear.
This fear does end, though, and as the long night of the terrible withdraws we are left with the full knowledge of the terrible, and possibilities of power. In repose Fear leaves its shadow, and it is this shadow we see when we contemplate the power of nature, in safety. When we contemplate the dynamically great and its kind and terrible nature, we no longer are in fear directly as Kant says, we are 'fearful', we are in deaths shadow, as fear. In the face of death but without fear, so terrible, but raising to ideas so noble. The battle of dominion the crucible of the beautiful. While not in fear, the relation of a smaller will to that of a larger will, and thus a smaller power to that of a larger power, this relation, this comparison carries with it an ever mindful consciousness of the possibility of the former, of us in the estimation of the formless sublime, as prey. Thus there can be no beauty without mercy from the monstrous, without repose from the terrible. The threat hangs as a promise to be fulfilled later. To make peace and not be prey. The 'power' of making, in the grace of mercy. Be still your heart now, calm your soul.
For in the power of making, however benevolent the purpose, part of the process is always somewhat the destruction of the material used in the making. Material used is changed in the making, the cutting of trees for wood, fire for the sword, etc. prey is used in the making of a meal. Now we face nature as might, as a power, a sheer power with the capacity to destroy.
Destruction in the collision of might towards making is either destruction of the object we have made, we have caused, or the destruction of ourselves and loved ones, therefore loss of self and destruction of capacity. Destruction here as death. In the feeling of the dynamically sublime what is destroyed is our power to bring to form. So it is no mistake that Kant acknowledges War as having something sublime in it. For the battle surely lost is near to the heart of comparison in the feeling of the dynamically sublime. For the comparison of might is nothing if not Battle at every successive juncture, from the schoolyard fist-fight, to the battles of Belfast, the West Bank, Bosnia. To the Battles of Korea & Vietnam, to Austerlitz and Antietam to Dresden, to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Then to the possibility of the great and catastrophic nuclear war. What is the horizon, the possibility for War?

But the infinite is absolutely (not merely comparatively) great. Compared with it everything else (of the same kind of magnitudes) is small. And what is most important is that to be able to think it as a whole indicates a faculty of mind which surpasses every standard of sense. For to represent it sensibly would require a comprehension having for a standard bearing a definite relation, expressible in numbers, to the infinite, which is impossible. Nevertheless, the bare capability of thinking this infinite without contradiction requires in the human mind a faculty itself supersensible. For it is only by means of this faculty and its idea of a noumenon - which admits of no intuition, but which yet serves as the substrate for the intuition of the world, as a mere phenomenon- that the infinite of the world of sense, in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude, can be completely comprehended under one concept, although in the mathematical estimation of magnitude by means of concepts of number it can never be completely thought. The faculty of being able to think the infinite of supersensible intuition as given ( in its intelligible substrate) surpasses every standard of sensibility and is great beyond all comparison even with the faculty of mathematical estimation. Not of course, in a theoretical point of view and on behalf of the cognitive faculty, but as an extension of the mind which feels itself able in another (practical) point of view to go beyond the limits of sensibility. 15

The flight of thought beyond the limits of sensibility progresses from the limited structure of the tactile, gravity-bound body to the flight of thought involved in a generating consciousness. Boundless, limitless, there is always a beyond to any fixed thought, or physical point of reference. Beyond standards of sense, the sensible standard. But so far as consciousness IS generating, it does contain within itself this beyond, or so it thinks. There is always thought beyond what can be made. The domain of power is thus limited, eclipsed by an idea that can always go beyond it. The sensible standard, that which is already made, possesses a limit, the end of its object. The frame, the parergon. The origin of the sensible standard- the power of making, possesses then not a limit, but a lack, a fundamental deficiency- in that there is always a beyond. The horizon of real power is thus possibility. This is power's objective nature from the standpoint of consciousness.
There is always a beyond to the advances of power, always an idea that eclipses it. The irony and paradox here is that because of the nature of possibility as always the horizon, the real aim of power in itself is hopeless from the standpoint of comparison and magnitude, the sensible standard!! Power, in comparison, from the viewpoint of magnitude possesses an innate structural deficiency for comparison, for greatness. Power for its own sake is structurally deficient, is hopeless. Reason cannot totalize because of the structure of possibility as the horizon beyond its marker, its limit. Dominion is always thwarted by the specter of the possible. Because of the possibility involved with the real indefinite, the limitless aim of power is unachievable. Power in itself, in reflection, is hopeless.
However an interesting shift occurs in the text. The spectrum of comparison moves from the treatment of sheer difference in magnitude, and difference in might, to that of a frame of mind compatible with apprehending the divine greatness. We can frame the progression here. In the analytic of the beautiful, in passive contemplation, we focused on the question what it means to call something beautiful, the exemplary work of art. In the analytic of the sublime we were brought to the analysis of the dimension of size and the dimension of strength, and the sheer notion of magnitude in comparison. Now in this part of the analysis the experience of the sublime is expanded to include estimating the divine greatness, which clearly includes morality. So we move from the comparison of sheer magnitude, to the comparison of works of art, to the notion of divine greatness. From magnitude to morality, from greatness in size to the greatness of god.

The man who is actually afraid, because he finds reasons for fear in himself, while conscious by his culpable disposition of offending against a might whose will is irresistible and at the same time just, is not in the frame of mind for admiring the Divine Greatness. 16


Comparison and the Mystery of Election

The fundamental strength of judgment in the dynamics of comparison is in the transition from magnitude to morality. In this transition is the return of purpose, reintroduced in the notion of the great. Although Kant makes no literal connection here, there is not a divorce between the notion of greatness, or the comparison of magnitude, of superiority, and the notion of good- what pleases through the concept. The loop here reties purposiveness. Kant’s definition of the Good is that which pleases through the concept. Then what is the ‘better’- that which pleases more through the concept. Pleases more, more suitable, the good is really, for all intents and purposes, the better-than. The better suited-than. It is rooted to purposiveness because in the effort to attain an aim, the ‘better’ is that which we choose.
Quality reflects the inner judgment of the good in the sense of touch we spoke of earlier, in the agreement of our senses with a thing, function, and the world. Quality also reflects a public judgment, a comparison of things and function, in a utilitarianism of sorts. Quality is measured through an externalization that reflects this mystic at root sense of ‘yes’. Quality is somewhat a choice, a decision, and decisions can be recorded- through the ballot box, through polls, and through the marketplace. In this way the inner perfection of quality is reflected publicly, if the product serves a purpose better, if it is ‘superior’, people will choose it, and we can count that choice.
In the workings of the mystery of election, Kant speaks of mystery as knowledge that cannot be shared publicly, but is present in the individual. From there Kant goes on to elaborate the structure of election as choice and the dual type of judgment- merit & condemnation that are contained within the arena of hope.
What is present here in this structure of election, is the nature of choice as contest, as a contest between two contestants. The comparison of choice. Possession is congealed throughout the nature and outcome of the contest. The mystery of election is an election not only of what is chosen, but just as much who is chosen - who will have and who will not. It is the election of the condemned- translated materially to those deprived of having.
Perhaps though what is equally the mystery is that which is described in the dynamics of the ‘mystery’ itself in Kant. The individual paradox of identification and the public arena. That which is known individually, cannot be shared. Here the sense of the individual is captured in the dynamics of force of possession, where the claim of ‘mine’ follows the model of ingestion, follows the model of the lion guarding its kill, not as an object, but an object of food. Possession here is a sense of ‘mine’ which if lost, can never be regained, and if lost- deprivation and hunger follow. In other words, the judgment of condemnation follows. ‘Mine’ in this sense is that which we need- to live, and this sense is present in every level of material success, up to the point where although there is plenty of food and means of resources to feed everyone in the world- this will not be done. It is at this point where the judgment - ‘cannot be shared’ meets that spoken of in the paragraph above. It is known individually and by all, and cannot be shared, and will not be spoken. We could even say that this at-root unspoken and universally known sense is a type of gravity which holds the sphere of power together. The purpose involved in the senses of making is always a ‘mine’, and it is this sense that binds and drives all making. This aspect of ‘mine’ is equally a part of the ‘common sense’, equally a part of the we- within and beyond the we. Where we ‘belong’, there also, belongs to me alone.
‘Cause’ is precisely the word we use to ascribe a sense of possession, a sense of having to the order of a particular event. A cause is that particular place or thing or action which ‘makes’ an event. Cause binds the chain, the sequence of absolute motion and physical change to the sphere of having. Cause looks at a sequence of appearances as a thing, a unit, the event, in order to see how the event is made. Cause implies to each event a maker, a central actor or set of actors which combine to produce what we observe as an event, as if a will were at work. Cause, responsibility, ownership.
This sense of possession is tied directly to physical suffering, and the contest- the election- occurs precisely between two who will not share, between two who participate in the same arena of hope, contesting in this arena for the order among men. The contest occurs, and is absolutely urgent for both.
In what way though could we say that this mystery is what is known but never said, present but cannot be said- not for lack of facility but for lack of courage- for fear of- a fear that cannot even be approached. Twisted throughout the tissue of flesh and nerve, as much a part of us as our hands. The sense of ‘we’ and ‘belonging’ is something away from the drive of speech, but to which every speech appeals- within and beyond the import of the voice.
The market is full of a tremendous amount and array of choices(comparisons), of elections, where on the other side of the transaction is a competing economic hope. The supplier offers his product or service to the market in hope of...., in hope of compensation. And this compensation is called fortune. Each purchase brings a judgment, however small & insignificant to the buyer, that brings a degree of ‘fortune’ to a supplier. The hope of capitalism is a ‘fortune’, captured in the dynamics of success as chance. The mystery of election- to elect to choose- to choose one is not to choose the other, and in the arena of marketplace the judgment of the buyer comes down as if it were a judgment rendered by god, like rain. It seems a power, vast and without form. Our Making is here brought to comparison, in ‘Quality’ in the arena of consequence, the arena of the tragic, therefore seemingly juridical judgment.
There seems to be a dual hyperbole in the term greatness. This hyperbole can be seen in attempting to understand the gap between the good and the great. The good -that which pleases through the concept, brings the notion of the pleasant as physical sensation into relationship with purpose, with purposive activity. Now given a multiplicity of choices with which to pursue our purpose, the dynamics of any election demand that we choose that which suits our purpose best among those choices. But does this make our choice ‘great’ in the spectrum or options, or merely better-suited-than. In the course of normal making and choosing the category greatness has no part. Why do we say that anything is great.
It seems that greatness comes into play when the consequences of the choice are heightened, so that the choice made, the effort expended, the power of will at hand, is absolutely necessary. Greatness seems to be what is needed to prevail over a far stronger predator or adversary- that without greatness, death is immanent. As the collision of paths seems ineluctable this hyperbole reflects the despair in the term greatness, the absolute urgency- that without greatness there will be death. The hyperbole is that greatness is necessary for survival. Greatness here is an inflamed state, where urgency is absolute, where adequacy is life, inadequacy death.
The second part of this hyperbole belongs to the order and comparison among men. In the great battle of bringing ourselves to order, the consequences become all the more exaggerated. What is at stake is one’s role in society, one’s place in the social strata, what can be won or lost in this the battle of self-interest. How much can be effected, be influenced. How are we going to be viewed in comparison with other human beings. Anarchy is always the politics of the truly disaffected, for the frustration and hatred that comes from not being effective, from disempowerment, is raised to a principle, and that principle says to destroy everything.
‘Great’ as we know it- is in one sense the immediate sensible interest of the self brought to wish. It is the ‘me’ not ‘you’. The inadequacy of the ‘not me’, this elected disapproval becomes the hatred towards ‘you’. The frustrated wish of the ‘no-not-me’ involved with the stymied effort will be shown forth in ‘what I will do to you, and you will be rendered powerless, paralyzed, and impotent. You will be rendered less a man as I destroy your power, because of the greatness of my power, and your pain will be so great, and you will see that ‘I AM LORD’, and the other will see my greatness and love me, want me. And my terribleness will be great beyond anything you can do, and my rage will be a weapon, and you will fear me, again and again. And I will take this from you, and have your place’. Thus is the twisted real time of the frustrated wish and thought of power turning in on itself, with no real curb, with no reference outside itself. It is the totally self-interested, the terror and desperation of the ‘mine’.
Being disaffected politically really means here to be completely effected materially, but to effect no one. Turbulence, chaos, and wound rule in the attempt to ride something of which we have no control. This the disaffected know, and the wish that springs from this then is to bring chaos to all, to make impotent everyone. To annihilate the world. Greatness here has to do with the comparison of our power of making in relation to the whole, to all other human beings and the order among men. Greatness here is the hyperbole of the wish of self-interest in the immediate, to find our place in the order among men.
The analysis of the process of productive Genius and the sub-conceptual breakdown of beauty into the aesthetical idea and rational concept are located in the analysis of the dialectic of the sublime. The judgment of taste is aesthetical, a passive estimation of the representation of the object to the subject and the feeling of pleasure or pain. However the production of the beautiful for others to estimate is a different story. First the artist has no object to reflect on, there is no object, yet, per say that the artist refers to, or estimates. What does the artist refer to, or where does the artist look for the new object of beauty? The artist attempts to realize to sense, to bring to sense a never-before sense of order. The artist attempts, struggles, battles to bring about a new order. This battle produces order, reorders experience in the making of the new, in the bringing to existence of the new object- the never-before. In this struggle of the act to Make in the production of the work of beautiful art, the artist is submitting to reflection the representation of an object of a new and different order of willing, the order of a will that is much greater than his or hers, the order of the noumena. This is what reflection compares in the act of making a new order and bringing this to sense, this is what the artist estimates. The process of making beautiful art has to do with reflection, and with will in the act to Make. To make here is both to make order and to make a sensible thing through effort. Therefore understanding, reason, and imagination are all involved in the struggle- the battle- of Productive Genius in the making of beautiful art.
The hyperbole of greatness involved in single self-interest comes into conflict in the presence of others. This conflict reorders experience, and also the dynamic of the comparison among men. Understanding becomes Wisdom. The eternally driving nature of desire with its twofold character of striving for greatness- to be more than adequate in comparison- in the face of the dynamics of the battle of the mystery of election-, with others who possess power as well, comes into an internal conflict with the anthropological root of man in our mutually interdependent nature. The battle is structured as a battle for the more adequate amongst those that are exactly the same. In the desire for approval of the other what have we won- is destroyed in the fighting. The love desired is vanquished. Mutually interdependent, we depend upon each other. Because we need this from each other, we will kill each other for it. It is a family fight that seems to produce a victor, but destroys the home and setting by which, and in which, we wish to live. Greatness is determined in the crucible of comparison, in the battle of comparison, to determine the order among men.
However the link to purposiveness roots the notion of superiority, of greatness, because it implies a scope of real function, a realness in everyday life and material, in everyday suffering and need. The passive estimation of the awesome, with the effort of the will in the making of an object, in the effort of a life. What makes a work great? What is a good life? What, if anything, do the greatness of man and the divine greatness have in common? Is there such a thing as a great man?

For judgment can be interpreted in two ways, as concerning either merit and lack of merit, or guilt and absence of guilt. God regarded as love ( in his son), judges men so far as merit is attributable to them over and above their indebtedness, and here the verdict is : worthy, or unworthy. He separates out as his own those to whom such merit can still be accredited. Those who are left depart empty-handed. On the other hand the sentence of the judge in terms of justice (of the judge properly so called, under the name of the Holy Ghost) upon those for whom no merit is forthcoming, is guilty or not guilty, i.e., condemnation or acquittal. This judging signifies first of all the separation of the deserving from the undeserving, both parties competing for a prize (salvation). By desert is here meant moral excellence, not in relation to the law (for in the eyes of the law no balance of obedience to duty over and above our indebtedness can accrue to us), but only in comparison with other men on the score of their moral disposition. And worthiness always has a merely negative meaning (not unworthiness), that is, the moral receptivity of such goodness.
Hence he who judges in the first capacity pronounces a judgment of choice between two persons (or parties) striving for the prize (of salvation); while he who judges in the second capacity (the real judge) passes sentence upon one and the same person before a court (conscience) which declares the final verdict between the prosecution and the defense. 17 Religion Within ...pg. 136-137

Final Purposes

Teleological judgment is a reflective judgment to determine whether a thing or process reflects design or not. Kant begins with the distinctions of types of design in the design of a thing, the design of an event as cause, the dialectical design of an organism, and then an unspoken analysis in the section on Final purposes on the design of the arc of life, the span of life in the design of a ‘lifetime’. The analytic of teleological judgment begins with an analysis that is in the midst of the analysis of design, in the midst of design theory. We ‘find’ ourselves in the midst of the judgment of design. But we judge from reflection, in looking for the marks of making, of purpose.
Parts of the text that do reflect a collective purpose occur in two places in the teleological judgment and one place in the aesthetic. 1) Man is assumed to be meant to live on the earth. 2) The value we have for life is the value we give to it. 3) Our mutually fallible interdependent nature. Design for Kant is found not on the level of the social whole, but on the level of the individual in a competitive dialectic of interdependence. Purpose and design are worked out here, so to speak.
The dynamic design of an organism describes the initial simple dialectical relationship of life. The description of an organism- an organized being is that of parts integral to the well being of the whole, and the well being of the whole is equally integral to the well being of the parts- where the relationship is interdependent. This description of interdependence also describes in effect the social dialectic between the individual and society. What differs between the two types of interdependence though is an additional layer of consciousness, of judgment, an activity that is not present in the relationship between part and organism.
The individual members amongst the social whole possess judgment, and thus the possibility of contest amongst the members constantly exists. Competition amongst the members makes the environment antagonistic towards the individual and yet the social dialectic still exists. The whole in this relationship does not possess singular judgment as in the case of the organism, where the whole subsumes the individual and particular purposiveness of the extremity. The whole possesses an active collection of judgment whose purpose as a unit is undefined, where the activity of the individual is subsumed within the whole, but the purpose of the individual is not directed from the whole. Therefore the teleological judgment does not deal with the design of the social dialectic but concentrates on the formulation of a final purpose at the level of the individual judgment- at the level of the person.
Let us return again to the dynamics of election as ‘contest’. The primary contest in election is between at least two who wish to be chosen through the offering of a product or service. But what that product or service appeals to is in at least some sense, a need of an individual or market. There is a sense of urgency then in the nature of the product as it serves some need. This is expressed in the economic term ‘demand’.
It is a public ‘demand’ that makes rise the contest of offering- the election of offering. Urgent, as well, on the other side, is the state of urgency behind the offering. Welfare hangs in the balance, so that great attention must be focused on the ‘inner perfection’ - the quality of the product or service. What this means is that the layer of individual judgment- and therefore feeling- that exists in the social dialectic- and absent in the interdependence dialectic of an individual organism- provides an energy or antagonism that drives the individual/social dialectic of interdependence. The appeal of need appeals to many voices, not the whole as one- appeals to us in the form of each other- and makes election of those that respond to that need. This is the dialectical agitation implied, concealed, in the demand- the urgency- that is present in the famous question ‘What ought we to do?’ What we will do, will be chosen- through the crucible of election. Individual need drives the social dialectic, so then design is not found on the level of the whole, but on the collected individual level, appealing and responding to each other. The only design that can be found in the tracing of the form of this dialectic is in the need- and therefore purpose- of each individual man to ‘live on the earth’.
In the teleological analysis of the arc traced by the span of a man’s lifetime, the teleological judgment becomes eschatological judgment because of the fact that each man dies. The reflective judgment on the limited form of this design, the design of the ‘lifetime’ of a man in relation to his work, his ‘purpose’- brings the course of reflection to the notion and positional value of ‘last things’, of a purpose for the lifetime of a man, and therefore for mankind as a whole.

“Only if we assume that men are to live upon the earth, then the means must be there without which they could not exist as animals.” 17

Death brings judgment into the arena of the ends of man in the apocalyptic literature of the bible, where the end of earthly mankind comes from a judgment, as does man’s individual destination- heaven or hell. So much does our concept of the world depend on the nature of any event deriving the source of the event as if it were generated from a will. The judgment of God in the Book of Revelations is the end of the world, a judgment of wrath. Actually it is the judgment of wrath, of total annihilation and of the annihilation of all human futures. The narrative in this sense is an explosion of the dynamics of defeat, of judgment at the point of choice on one side and the finality and totality of defeat on the other.

And I heard a great voice out of the temple, saying to the seven angels: Go and pour out the seven vials of the wrath of God upon the earth.
Revelations- Chapter 16, verse 1 18

What is present in the narrative is the sense of helplessness and weakness reflected upon in the telling. Man is here totally inadequate before God, and there is now nothing which we can do. Man compares himself to God here mortally, and in relation to only the power of God in relation to his power and our mortality. But what is exploded in the narrative is precisely the point of defeat in the dynamics of the contest of life, with death. We have been defeated, because each man dies. In the arena of hope, the contest of dominion, the arc of life as contest, as fighting death is in each instance and forever lost by the judgment of God. Wrath here is the comparison of power, raised to a principle. Our darkest thoughts, and our darkest fears are brought before all judgment itself. We are guilty and nothing is beautiful before God. Every hatred and every fear are now infinitely present to sense and exploded, and every hope vanquished. The end of the world in Revelations explodes the fear of man to the ineluctable nature of death and also expiates the wrath of God, showing the dynamics of wrath raised to a principle. Such is the nature of juridical judgment in a treatment of equity, and violation of the covenant. Judgment is brought not only to the price of crime, but to expiate the wrath of the victim. The narrative in this sense is an explosion of the dynamics of defeat, of judgment at the point of choice as defeat.
The logic of superabundance 19 of St. Paul, described by Ricoeur in the essay ‘Interpretation of the Myth of Punishment’, seems to offer a more alluring description of hope in the concept of ‘more’- in the “How much More?”... Here the benefit of participation in the logic of the gift is a reaping, the offering of a higher compensation rather than the mere price paid in the equity structure of punishment in the arena of abstract right. However, contrary to Ricoeur, the judgment of merit and the judgment of guilt or innocence meet in the arena of hope and expectation. Here, in the arena of hope, both judgments form extremes of the same judgment. In the arena of hope and expectation, for the God of love, the meritorious judgment awards or does not award a prize, and juridical judgment of the God of wrath condemns or does not condemn. The judgment of grace and the judgment of wrath thus enjoy the same spectrum. In the arena of hope and expectation the judgment of merit from the God of love means abundance, health, wealth, compensation, happiness. In the juridical judgment the condemnation of the God of wrath means deprivation, means inadequacy, means punishment. The marketplace is precisely an arena of hopes for the participants, where man literally attempts to live on the earth. The judgment of merit- quality, the better, of a product or a service comes as grace, as good fortune. The judgment of the market player to choose another product, for the supplier offering such a product, this judgment shares the material conditions of a judgment of condemnation, of deprivation and punishment. The juridical logic and the logic of superabundance thus share the same spectrum of judgment in the spectrum of hope, both present in the prayer of hope to the highest power.

“Give us this day our daily Bread, and forgive us our trespasses,...”20

Yet individual purpose surges with capability and wanes with incapacity, failure, old age etc.. Individuals in the social dialectic grow old and die, and the force of their purpose peels off and vanishes from the social sphere of power in contest. The Darwinian model of natural selection comes to mind here If the purpose is indeed for man to live from the earth. But that Is no longer a question!! Nature is no longer a true adversary, but merely a hindrance. That purpose is forever exhausted, defeated. Man as a whole easily lives from the earth. There seems to be then no primary value anymore in the design of this complicated social dialectic, no logic but that of an aimless runaway desire of individual need. To wake up just once more.
But because each man dies perhaps it is that man was not meant to live on the earth, but to live with each other. Can we assume that man is not meant to live in dominion of the earth, but with each other. Can we assume this because of the universality of death in the death of each man, or does our own temporary and immediate sense of possession, our own sense of life as fighting death , does this condition the impossibility of this approach. Let us say this anyway- because each man dies man is not meant to live on the earth, man is meant to live with each other.
Design assists in living, with design we live on the earth. Dying however dissolves all force of individual possession & dissolves all sense of having and dominion. All that remains here is what we have given and what we have made for others. To live in accordance with the principle of death, for each man to accept the notion of living with their own death places the value of purpose in action towards the other. It is a different type of exaltation, an exaltation of ‘for the sake of others’, and changes the dynamic workings of the social dialectic.
What explodes the knowledge and structure of the logic of punishment and equity is not in the logic, as Ricoeur believes, but in a transportation from the scene of the logic (punishment)- of the scene of the broken covenant- to the scene of the reception of grace only.
But what really occurs in the transportation from one scene to another in the absurd logic of superabundance is not only a transportation from one exaggerated scene to another, not only a transportation from the scene of the tragic and retribution to the scene of grace. What occurs is a total transportation from the scene of the contest of the market. In the logic of superabundance the contest of one ‘mine’ against another, and the outcome of this contest are not the goal. Hope and expectation are not placed on the success of the offering, the goal in a logic of superabundance is the focus on the inner rooted sense of quality of the offering in the comparison with oneself- to give our best. To act according to this transports us once more, from the scene of grace and the gift received to the scene of giving.
In this scene and in the act of giving I become the work and the work becomes other, the other- now a piece- becomes as a sign and transforms and reorders upon observation and becomes we. Perfection then is merely a component of agreement, a completion of work in the step towards the other21 Perfection as a work and as grace completes some others need, never mine. Perfection as grace received not only alleviates a need, but also enables-me-to. Therefore the value of life is not only the value I give My life, but the value which we give our life, our common life, the value we give to the life of others. To exalt a thing as beautiful exalts agreement, and to exalt agreement sacrifices the self in order to exalt the other. Perfection is then not that substance that is without need, as Heidegger describes it,22 but has everything to do with need, addresses need, rushes to anothers need, and perfects the self in the process by becoming perfect in our work for others. Within and beyond the self of my life is the otherlife, the life of giving- an exalted life, and within and beyond the self of my world is the otherworld- an exalted world.
A final purpose for Kant is that purpose which needs no other as a condition of its possibility. According to Kant, Man is the final purpose of creation.

The value of life for us, if it is estimated by that which we enjoy, is easy to decide. It sinks below zero, for who would be willing to enter upon life anew under the same conditions? Who would do so even according to a new, self chosen plan, if it were merely directed to enjoyment? We have shown above what value life has in virtue of what it contains in itself, when lived in accordance with the purpose that nature has along with us, and which consists in what we do, in which however we are always but means toward an undetermined final purpose. There remains then nothing but the value which we ourselves give our life, through what we cannot only do but do purposively in such independence of nature that the existence of nature itself can only be a purpose under this condition. 23

The beautiful in the 3rd Critique is the exemplary23- that which we can make example of. But an example of what? An example of acting, an example of making perhaps, an example of doing work. The beautiful is that product of making which we aspire to, it is that to which we give our best. The 3rd Critique thus in one sense answers the famous question at the center of the 2nd critique- What ought we to do?- in this project of mankind. The beautiful provides a surplus of thought, gives rise to thought, while simultaneously saying “make beautifully with me”. Hope and kinship are thus built into the 3rd Critique’s notion of beauty in the vector of purpose. The hope provided by an example, a nudge, “this is what can be done”, kinship and fraternity are present in the notion of example, in the arena of the public- “with me”- from one who is “just like you”, in a common sense. Above all perhaps what is most exemplary about the beautiful is that it is a work of agreement. A work that is a working towards the other, a dissolution of the self and a pouring of the self towards some other. The harmony, the agreement occurs both within the self and beyond the self- in a work and in a material that are released from what I consider mine and dissolve away, that slip from all sense of ownership. It is the cacophonous yes by which the chord comes to be- in song then- to extend and lift up the very existence of the word, of the voice, with that of each other.
As individual man is the final purpose of creation- what is the final purpose of man? This, as Kant shows, is left undetermined, left as indefinite. It would be much easier for our own sense of certainty if this path was clear and already illuminated, if this map were already made. But man is autonomous, and thus self-legislative, so no definite map is present.
With all this in mind in one sense however, there is a map left behind. If we will look closely and carefully into the structure of what we know, and how we judge, and how it comes to be that we act, we will see how defining this map is. The purpose of man on earth is making, bound by our understanding, imagination and sense, and bound by our competitively interdependent suffering fallible nature. We have each other, and there is no one else. And what we make, and therefore what we make- of man- is left to our freedom. This puts beauty in question for a different reading of the Critique of Judgment. What will we give our life for? Who will we give our best to? Will anything be judged beautiful in our modern times, anything at all?



Notes
1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, (New York: Hafner, 1972) pg. 37.
2. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, (New York: Hafner, 1972).
3. Kant, pg. 54-55.
4. Kant, pg. 54.
5. Kant, pg. 231.
6. Jean-Francois Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994)
7. Kant, pg. 12.
8. Kant, pg. 55.
9. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977)
10. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1973) pg. 202.
11. Kant, pg. 14.
12. Kant, pg. 99.
13. Kant, pg. 100.
14. Hegel, pg. 68.
15. Kant, pg. 93-94.
16. Kant, pg. 102.
17. Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, (New York: Harper, 1960) pg. 136-137.
18. Revelations, Chapter 16, Verse 1.
19. Paul Ricoeur, “The Interpretation of the Myth of Punishment, in Conflict of Interpretations, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974) pg.
20. The Lords Prayer.
21. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), pg.
22. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pg. 125.
23. Kant, C. of J., pg. 284.
24. Kant, C. of J., pg.